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T
he investment banking community has
recently been the object of scorn, both
on the regulatory front and in the press.
Critics have alleged a distinct lack of
independence in banks’ behavior and
policies with regard to the objective-
ness and independence of the research reports and
analyst recommendations. Retail investors, institu-
tional investors, federal and state regulators, and
Congress have expressed outrage over the conflicts
of interest that can exist in these large banks. In
particular, they are disturbed that these conflicts can
lead analysts to craft research opinions that differ
from what would be produced by a dispassionate and
economically disinterested party. 
The issue came to a head in April 2003, when ten
investment banks agreed to a set of behavioral and
structural reforms, in addition to fines and penalties
of more than $1.3 billion, to settle charges brought
by federal and state regulators and self-regulatory
organizations (SROs) concerning conflicts of inter-
est. These reforms included the physical separation
of research and investment banking, changes in the
nature of analyst compensation contracts, and stric-
tures prohibiting analysts from attending road shows.
Investment banks are also required to offer cus-
tomers access to the research products of at least
three independent research firms for five years. 
These conflicts of interest are nothing new, and
their existence was widely known throughout the
financial community. The conflicts are a consequence
of the function of investment banks, which interme-
diate the interaction between issuers and investors
in capital markets. Why the issue came to the fore
in the last few years is debatable, but certainly con-
tributing factors include the sharp market decline
after March 2000, the egregiousness of certain rev-
elations about e-mails and business arrangements
involving the banks, and the compensation levels
and brashness of various high-profile bank employ-
ees. The public was outraged, and it would have its
pound of flesh.
The purpose of this paper is not to debate whether
analysts should be allowed to privately disparage
stocks while publicly recommending them as “strong
buys” or whether senior executives of corporations
should receive lucrative allocations of initial public
offering (IPO) shares as inducement for sending
corporate finance business toward the underwriting
investment banks. Such actions may distort capital
markets, and they should be discouraged. My con-
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There are certain sweet-smelling sugar-coated lies current in the
world which all politic men have apparently tacitly conspired together
to support and perpetuate. One of these is, that there is such a thing
in the world as independence: independence of thought, indepen-
dence of opinion, independence of action. Another is that the world
loves to see independence—admires it, applauds it.
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may have proprietary or principal operations, either
in trading or merchant banking. 
Abstracting from these institutional activities,
one can see that banks perform a much smaller set
of basic financial functions. Consistent with the
functional framework of Merton and Bodie (1995,
chap. 1), investment banks perform five of the six
basic functions that they say are required of any
well-functioning financial system. These functions
are (1) pooling resources and subdividing shares,
(2) transferring resources across space and time,
(3) providing mechanisms to manage risk, (4) pro-
viding information, and especially prices, needed
to coordinate decentralized decision making in the
economy, and (5) providing mechanisms to solve
problems of asymmetric information, agency prob-
lems, and incentives.3 Notable for the purposes of
this discussion is Merton and Bodie’s emphasis on
the information-based functions required of financial
systems. As applied to investment banks, the tasks
of pricing securities and brokering information
between counterparties to a transaction, whether a
share issuance or a capital markets transaction, are
vital to banks’ operations. 
The completeness of the financial functions offered
within a large integrated investment bank is a con-
sequence of the scope economies that arise from
housing various institutional functions under one
roof. For example, for a successful issuance of new
stock, the bank must be able to distribute new
shares into the hands of its investment clients. To
execute this function well, the shares should be
distributed broadly and held by an investor base
whose traits are acceptable to the corporate issuer.
Accomplishing this function requires an established
network with the trading desks and portfolio man-
agers of large buy-side investment firms. Corporate
issuances are too infrequent for relationships with
banks to grow by themselves, but the day-to-day
trading operations of banks naturally tie the bank to
the institutional investor. Similarly, the information
produced by the analyst who works in the research
department can be of use to the bank’s investment
bankers, the proprietary trading operations of the
bank, the block trading operations of the bank, and
the bank’s retail and institutional clients. 
Of course, not all of the scope economies discussed
above are permitted under the law. The reason is that
they present substantive conflicts of interest for
the bank. These conflicts are unavoidable for any
bank that chooses to be in the broad menu of the insti-
tutional businesses discussed in the paragraphs above.
By operating in these business lines, the banks in
turn perform some or all of the five financial functions
what we really know about the nature of the con-
flicts of interest within investment banks and how, if
at all, these conflicts have actually harmed investors.
I do this by looking at the academic evidence on
analysts and their work and how the stock market
reacts to their pronouncements. I also consider the
effects of certain other institutional arrangements
and potential conflicts of interest that exist in invest-
ment banks and consider how these affect banks’
practices and incentives. I then use this analysis to
examine some of the solutions imposed by the reg-
ulators to see if these solutions are sensible and
cost effective and can reasonably be expected to
remedy the alleged harms.
What Do Investment Banks Do?
I
n their book Doing Deals, Eccles and Crane define
the function of an investment bank as “mediating
the flow of assets between issuers and investors”
(1988, chap. 2). In the pure investment banking or
corporate finance relationship, investment banks’
fundamental purpose is to lower the frictions
involved in issuing new securities.2 These frictions
arise because the two primary parties to the trans-
action are generally geographically separate, have
no or only limited knowledge about the other party,
and have opposing interests in the precise terms of
the transaction. For example, issuers prefer a higher
price for their securities while investors would pre-
fer to buy the paper at a lower price. 
Institutionally, however, banks do far more than
aid in the issuance of securities. Though issuance is
an important corporate finance function, banks also
provide advice in mergers and acquisitions and aid
in designing customized securities to suit issuers’
needs through structured finance. Banks generally
have extensive sales and trading operations across
asset classes and frequently operate money man-
agement operations on an agency basis for institu-
tional clients. For the purposes of this paper, it is
important to note that a large class of investment
banks also have retail operations, providing broker-
age services to individual investors. Finally, banks
In the pure investment banking or corporate
finance relationship, investment banks’ fun-
damental purpose is to lower the frictions
involved in issuing new securities.1. Mark Twain’s autobiography, as quoted by Benn Steil in Securities Industry News, August 25, 2003.
2. For reasons of brevity and clarity, I will use the term “investment bank” interchangeably with the term “bank.” Where there
is danger of confusion, I will refer explicitly to a “commercial bank.”
3. The final function, clearing and settling payments, is only partially done by investment banks in the United States. While
investment banks can have huge clearing operations, it is commercial banks that are generally regarded as the window into
the U.S. payment system. 
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delineated by Merton and Bodie. Though formal and
obvious structures that violate conflict of interest rules
may readily be prohibited, subtle ways to circumvent
the prohibitions, especially restrictions based on infor-
mation flow, may arise. This latter class of conflict-of-
interest concerns may be hard to police as they do
not directly involve forbidden trades or transactions,
such as might occur if, for example, a bank-managed
mutual fund executed its stock trades using an inter-
nal trading desk and received prices inferior to those
in the broad stock market. 
As profit-maximizing entities, banks have their
own reasons to exercise control over conflict-of-
interest matters. If clients lose faith in their ability
to get a fair deal at the bank, business will founder.
Senior management will therefore put in place mech-
anisms to temper these conflict concerns. However,
such mechanisms do not mean that factors such as
rich performance bonuses, contingent compensation,
or moral hazard concerns at the level of the employee
or trading desk cannot lead to serious issues. 
To gauge the potential severity of the conflict-of-
interest problem, we can examine the relative size
of the various business segments of the securities
industry as a whole. Table 1 reports the revenue for
the investment banking, trading, proprietary trad-
ing, underwriting, asset management, and research
segments of the business for 1999, 2001, and 2003.
Several features of these data are immediately
clear. The first is that the underwriting business
makes up only about 10 percent of the revenue for
investment banks in 2003. Trading commissions,
proprietary trading, and mutual fund and asset
management fees all generate more revenue than
underwriting. At least at an aggregate level, from a
conflict-of-interest perspective there does not appear
to be a profit-maximizing reason to sacrifice other
revenue segments in favor of the revenue from
investment banking.
Table 2 examines similar data on a firm-level
basis for three large integrated banks: Merrill
Lynch, Morgan Stanley, and UBS. Though the firms
themselves differ in how they choose to do business,
for each of these banks investment banking is less
than 15 percent of the revenue stream. Yet all three
of these firms have been part of settlements with
regulators for conflicts of interest between research
and investment banking. 
In $millions As a percentage
Revenue 1999 2001 2003 1999 2001 2003
Commissions 29,310.5 26,825.2 25,661.4 16.0 13.8 17.8
Trading gain (loss) 36,422.8 24,914.1 23,136.5 19.9 12.8 16.0
Investment account gain (loss) 2,379.2 297.5 2,115.7 1.3 0.2 1.5
Underwriting revenue 16,026.3 15,630.9 15,090.0 8.7 8.0 10.4
Equity underwriting revenue 3,791.3 3,921.0 3,697.8 2.1 2.0 2.6
Mutual fund sale revenue 6,663.4 6,329.0 6,064.9 3.6 3.2 4.2
Fees, asset management 11,450.3 13,196.6 11,761.6 6.2 6.8 8.1
Research revenue 156.6 183.6 170.0 0.1 0.1 0.1
Commodities revenue –8,723.3 4,907.6 –1,902.4 –4.8 2.5 –1.3
Other revenue related to the
securities business 66,719.2 79,714.8 47,898.3 36.4 40.9 33.1
Other revenue 9,546.5 9,923.2 9,743.1 5.2 5.1 6.7
Total revenue 183,367.3 194,766.2 144,516.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Securities Industry Association, 2003
TABLE 1
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The second class of tasks is the de facto unac-
knowledged tasks of the analyst. These include var-
ious types of information brokerage, including
arranging for investor visits with executives of cov-
ered companies or perhaps with executives of cor-
porate finance clients of the bank. Especially for
smaller buy-side shops that are unable to get the
attention of their portfolio companies, this last
function is a great service to the portfolio managers.
Conversely, the analyst will work with the invest-
ment banking side of the house and may assist in
evaluating firms for banking deals or due diligence
work or in executing various types of corporate
finance mandates. It should be noted that these
tasks do not apply just to equity analysts. Though
the tasks and nature of the work product differ,
much of what is said here applies for fixed-income
analysts as well. 
In the above situations, analysts may find them-
selves in conflict-of-interest situations in which
they are representing the interests of two parties
whose interests are by definition not aligned. The
prime example of this conflict is the role the
research analyst plays in landing investment bank-
ing mandates. That analysts consider this a vital
aspect of their job has been widely known for years.
In Galant (1992), an analyst at a major sell-side firm
admits to spending as much as 80 percent of her
time on investment banking research. Senior man-
agement at another bank stated that “one of the
things we sell is research” and that research is crit-
ical to wooing corporate clients. Management of
issuers appears to understand this fact as well
because the article quotes the CFO of one firm who
interviewed not only the bankers but the analysts of
six banks when shopping for an underwriter. Even
more surprising are the analyst compensation
arrangements discussed in the article, in which
It is somewhat of a puzzle to understand why
sophisticated firms would willingly dissipate their
business reputations in large segments of their busi-
ness to favor revenue streams from smaller business
segments. A complete exploration of the nature of
these conflict-of-interest violations is beyond the
scope of this paper, and I will take as given the fact
patterns described in the various regulatory settle-
ments and pronouncements over the last few years.
What is clear is that the scope economies that arise
from housing the customary business lines of invest-
ment banks under one roof lead to clear conflicts of
interest. In the case of IPOs, a bank is asked to serve
two masters, the issuer and the investors. As such,
the conflicts are endemic. In the next section I will
explore what the academic literature has to say
about market reaction to these conflicts.
The Conflicts: Institutional Practice and
Academic Evidence
C
orporate issuance versus research. Before
considering the evidence on analyst conflicts,
it is worthwhile to consider the nature of the sell-
side analyst’s job. The job falls into two parts. The
first is the set of tasks that are the acknowledged
to be customary part of the analyst’s job. This
includes developing an expertise in the covered
firms and about the industry in which they oper-
ate. This expertise extends to include competitors,
suppliers, customers, etc. With this knowledge the
analyst will customarily make forecasts of future
earnings as well as recommendations on the pos-
ture investors should take toward covered stocks.
These recommendations are usually some variant
of strong buy/buy/hold/sell/strong sell. In addition,
analysts will talk with buy-side customers to share
ideas with them and to assist them in selecting
portfolio securities. 
Function Merrill Lynch Morgan Stanley UBS
Asset management 23.2 19.8 55.2
Commissions 22.2 15.9 0.0
Principal transactions 15.2 33.2 0.0
Investment banking 13.1 13.1 6.5
Net interest profit 20.2 15.5 0.0
Other 6.1 2.4 38.3
100.0 100.0 100.0
Note: The categories of commissions, principal transactions, and net interest profit were not separately reported in the UBS filings.
These figures are lumped into the “other” figure.
Source: Merrill Lynch 2003 10-K, Morgan Stanley 2003 10-K, UBS 2003 Annual Review
TABLE 2
Revenue Breakdown for Three Large Banks (Percent)4. The literature on the interaction between analysts, underwriters, and stock returns is voluminous, and it is not possible to
even survey that literature here. Ritter and Welch (2002) have a survey of IPO activity while papers by Bradley, Jordan, and
Ritter (2003) and Clarke et al. (2004) touch upon many of the issues discussed in this section.
The contrasting results of Michaely and Womack (1999), which show a post-recommendation price drift, are still a bit of a
puzzle. There is a good chance that their results are time frame specific as the results have not appeared in other sample periods.
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some banks pay 5 to 10 percent of the net under-
writing fee to the analyst responsible for landing
new underwriting mandates.
The existence of these arrangements is supported
by the work of Eccles and Crane (1988) in their book
on how investment banks do deals. In a chapter on
the bonus process, the authors discuss how analysts
are paid. They point out that in all the firms they
studied, research was not regarded as generating
revenue but rather as a cost center. Money to pay
research bonuses was therefore supplied by other
revenue-generating functions such as sales and
trading and investment banking. The authors observe
that such a structure serves to strengthen the ties
between research and the source of bonus revenue.
Interestingly, Eccles and Crane found that it was
the medium-sized firms, and not the largest firms,
where the banking-research tie was the strongest
and the compensation schemes most intertwined.
The authors speculate that this finding occurs
because the corporate client relationships were not
as strong in the medium-sized firms as they were in
the largest banks. 
These working and compensation arrange-
ments appear problematic. More interesting, how-
ever, is financial markets’ ability to see through
these conflicts and appropriately price shares in
light of analyst pronouncements. To investigate
this question, we turn to the academic record on
analysts’ earnings forecasts, analyst recommenda-
tions, and their interactions with stock returns
and underwriting mandates.4
We first consider what issuers look for when
selecting an investment bank. According to the
survey in Galant (1992), “74 percent of the CFOs
involved in 1991’s largest IPOs said they regarded
the quality of the research department as a very
important if not the most important factor in choos-
ing a lead underwriter.” These findings are corrobo-
rated by the study of Krigman, Shaw, and Womack
(2001), who look at the reasons why issuers change
underwriters between their IPO and a subsequent
secondary offering. Among other things, Krigman,
Shaw, and Womack find that the key reason for
switching underwriters is to buy influential analyst
coverage. When asked why they switched under-
writers, 54.7 percent cited the quality and reputa-
tion of the research department/analyst as one of
the top three reasons for the switch. This reason
was the one most frequently cited, with the excep-
tion of overall underwriter reputation. Thus, it seems
clear that issuers actively seek out reputable ana-
lysts and research departments for their banking
work. Ellis, Michaely, and O’Hara (2004) have noted,
however, that when firms switch underwriters the
new underwriters are generally more optimistic than
the old and move to establish substantial market-
making operations in the firm’s equity, a result the
authors attribute to the competitive nature of the
banking industry.
The results above relate only to the general qual-
ity of the analyst and research group. In a recent
study, Ljungqvist, Marston, and Wilhelm (2003)
examine the 16,625 U.S. debt and equity offerings
over a ten-year period to asses whether analyst rec-
ommendations or recommendation upgrades had
an effect on a bank’s propensity to win the under-
writing mandate. After controlling for other effects,
the authors “find no evidence that analyst recom-
mendation behavior favorably influenced whether
banks won either debt or equity mandates. Far
more important appears to be the strength of the
bank’s relationship with the issuer as measured by
the share of the issuer’s past securities offerings
(both debt and equity) underwritten by the bank,
and to a somewhat lesser extent the strength of
prior lending relationships” (p. 2). 
Thus, the literature suggests that corporate
executives favor the overall quality of the invest-
ment bank, and especially the quality of the
research operation, when selecting an issuer. The
underwriting mandate is not “bought” through the
issuance of biased or overly optimistic research by
the bank analyst.
As profit-maximizing entities, banks have their
own reasons to exercise control over conflict-
of-interest matters.28 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Fourth Quarter 2004
They find that analyst coverage leads to a signifi-
cant 4.1 percent rise in prices but that firms that do
not receive analyst coverage have only a 0.1 percent
price rise. Further, they show that this price rise
occurs in the few days leading up to the end of the
quiet period, suggesting that the market correctly
anticipates the onset of analyst coverage. Unlike
Michaely and Womack (1999), however, Bradley,
Jordan, and Ritter find that this price rise is not
affected by whether or not the analyst is affiliated
with the lead underwriter.
Clarke et al. (2004) try to pursue the nature of
the conflict of interest in more detail. The authors
partition sell-side firms into three groups: investment
banks, brokerage-only firms (with no investment
banking operations), and independent research firms.
The authors then study the accuracy of analysts’
earnings forecasts, the biases in their recommenda-
tions, and whether there is any differential market
reaction to these pronouncements depending on
the type of broker that employs the analyst. The
authors find that analysts at large investment banks
issue less optimistic earnings forecasts relative to
consensus numbers than do the other two types of
analysts. Also, investment bank analysts issue among
the most accurate forecasts of any of the three ana-
lyst groupings. Notably, analysts who work for large
investment banks appear to be less timid than their
brethren in that they tend to issue the first forecast
in a given quarter. 
Turning to analyst buy/sell recommendation
changes, Clarke et al. find that analysts who work
for independent brokers are less likely to issue
strongly positive recommendations than are ana-
lysts who work for the other two types of brokers.
However, the market regards the upgrades by
investment banks as being more informative than
the others. Long-term performance is also better for
upgrades by analysts who work for investment
banks. Finally, the authors look at instances in
which the analyst moves from one type of bank to
another. They find that there is no statistically sig-
nificant change in behavior when analysts move
from a brokerage-only firm or an independent
research firm to an investment bank, The authors
interpret their results as being “inconsistent with
the hypothesis that analysts at investment banks
are biased and markets are unaware of this bias.”5
Taken together, and in light of the recent $1.4
billion research settlement, the results are surpris-
ing. Though there is evidence that analyst buy/sell
recommendations are biased, the market appears to
understand and correct for this bias. Further, ana-
lysts at large banks appear to make less biased and
It has been well known for years that analyst rec-
ommendations are upwardly biased and that prior
to 2003 there were virtually no “sell” recommenda-
tions made by sell-side analysts. Using a sample from
1989–91, Womack (1996) shows that “buy” recom-
mendations are seven times more common than “sell”
recommendations. Further, he finds that “buys” lead
to a 3.0 percent price increase at the recommenda-
tion time while “sells” lead to a 4.7 percent price
decrease. He further finds that prices continue to
drift for several months in the direction of the initial
price reaction. 
Continuing this line of work, Michaely and
Womack (1999) look at IPOs over a similar time
period to see if stock price reactions are affected by
whether the research recommendation was deliv-
ered by the analyst who worked for the lead under-
writer of the IPO. Looking at recommendations at
the end of the post-IPO quiet period, Michaely and
Womack find that lead underwriter analysts make
50 percent more “buy” recommendations than unaf-
filiated analysts do. More importantly, they find that
the market appears to be fooled by the biased rec-
ommendations of underwriter analysts. Though
prices react less favorably to affiliated versus unaf-
filiated analysts at the time of the “buy” recommen-
dation, there is substantial underperformance of
the stocks recommended by the affiliated analyst in
the two years following the IPO. By looking at the
performance of recommendations of stocks for
which these same banks were not the lead under-
writer, the authors were able to show that this
effect was due to a bias and not a lack of skill on the
affiliated analysts’ part.
The Michaely and Womack finding provides
some evidence of analyst bias for which the stock
market is unable to adjust. Two more recent papers
seem to suggest, however, that the market is able to
consider the biases of affiliated analysts in coming
to a price for the stock. In the first of these papers,
Bradley, Jordan, and Ritter (2003) look at the onset
of analyst coverage at the end of the quiet period.
The literature suggests that corporate execu-
tives favor the overall quality of the invest-
ment bank, and especially the quality of the
research operation, when selecting an issuer.5. The arrangement is not dissimilar from the case of rating agencies where issuers pay the agencies money to get their new
issues rated.
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more precise earnings forecasts than those made by
analysts who work for independent research firms.
We will return to these findings when we discuss
the provisions of the research settlement, but first
we will discuss several other conflicts within invest-
ment banks.
Sales/trading versus research. At its most
pure, research involves sifting through public and
other legitimately gathered information to make
more precise inferences about a security’s value.
Once the information is processed, the analyst has
a choice of what he can do with the information.
The analyst could release it in a broadly dissemi-
nated report that would arrive at all investor’s desks
at the same time. Alternately, the analyst could
favor some investors over others in choosing how to
disseminate the information. For example, if the
information arose because of some corporate
finance work the analyst did, she could be tempted
to pass the information on to a favored trading
client, perhaps a large and high commission–paying
hedge fund. She could also allow the information to
be used internally at the bank’s proprietary trading
desk, where the bank may establish a large princi-
pal position based on the information. All of the
above possibilities pose a clear conflict with the
banking relationship. 
Proprietary trading versus sales and trading.
Proprietary trading operations are often likened to
a hedge fund within the bank: They are operations
that execute trading strategies with the bank’s cap-
ital and often compete with the investment bank’s
own customers. As such, conflicts abound in terms
of who receives the rights to certain trading oppor-
tunities. For example, as part of a large sales and
trading operation, a bank learns much about the
trading desires of its institutional counterparties.
Though the buy-side firms try to limit it, they can-
not help but give up some information about their
trading demands to the bank. A clear conflict exists
in that the bank’s trading desk would like to pass
this information on the internal proprietary trading
operation to trade ahead of their own customers
and free-ride on the client’s information. Such front-
running is of course prohibited. 
Yet more subtle forms of this conflict exist. The
process of internalization of retail orders is one such
example. Retail order flow is generally regarded as
uninformed and thus profitable to trade against.
Such orders can simply be routed to a central
exchange such as the NYSE for execution. In doing
this the bank’s obligation to its retail customers for
best execution would likely be complete. However,
banks have an incentive to selectively trade against
the retail orders on a proprietary basis, buying
those stocks it feels are slightly undervalued and
selling those that are dear. By doing this continu-
ously over a large number of stocks through the
course of the day, the firm can earn a considerable
profit. In the absence of the internalization opera-
tion, it is not clear whether those profits would have
inured to the retail investors or to the NYSE.
Whatever the case, trading as principal against
uninformed retail flows is a clear conflict of interest
by an investment bank that to date has passed
muster with regulators.
In the examples above, the conflicts of interest
discussed existed wholly within the bank itself. The
conflict was between research and corporate
finance or between proprietary trading and sales/
trading. Another class of bank conflicts of interest
relates to bank’s customers. Problems can arise
when (1) the bank’s customers face either conflict
or agency problems and (2) the bank can exploit
those conflicts while (3) at the same time being
exploited by these same customers. In such a set-
ting, both the bank and its customer may further
their own ends at the expense of some third party.
For example, consider the case of the conflict
between institutional investors and the investment
bank involving a research report in which the bank’s
analyst is about to downgrade a particular stock. If
the buy-side firm has a large position in the stock, it
may pressure the bank not to issue the downgrade.
The lever to do so could be the large trading com-
missions generated by the investor, setting the
research analyst at odds with the bank’s sales and
trading desk. The buy-side firm understands this
pressure and may not hesitate to use it to kill, or at
least forestall, the report until it has sold out of its
position. By threatening to withhold trading busi-
ness from the bank, the institutional investor effec-
tively exploits the internal research conflict to its
own benefit.
As an example of another conflict involving out-
side parties, the recent settlement between the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) (2003)
and J.P. Morgan Securities highlighted the conflicts
that arise in the case of IPO allocations and ladder-
ing transactions. In this case, the SEC found that
J.P. Morgan had caused institutional investors to
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In summary, we have seen that investment banks
are fraught with a host of conflicts of interest, some
wholly contained within the bank and others that
exist on a broader scale. Thus, the conflicts in the
research analyst versus underwriting situation are
simply an instance of the wide range of conflicts that
are endemic to the investment banking business.
Policy Considerations and Alternatives
H
aving discussed the institutional arrangements
in investment banks and some of the empirical
results on analyst conflicts, I turn now to the policy
implications for these issues. The global research
settlement struck with the major U.S. regulators in
April 2003 can serve as a straw man for the policy
solutions that might be considered for this conflict.
Among the provisions of the settlement are the fol-
lowing conditions:
• The firms will physically separate their research
and investment banking departments to prevent
the flow of information between the two groups.
• The firms’ senior management will determine the
research departments’ budgets without input from
investment banking and without regard to specific
revenues derived from investment banking.
• Research analysts’ compensation may not be
based, directly or indirectly, on investment bank-
ing revenues or input from investment banking
personnel, and investment bankers will have no
role in evaluating analysts’ job performance.
• Research management will make all company-
specific decisions to terminate coverage, and
investment bankers will have no role in company-
specific coverage decisions.
• Research analysts will be prohibited from partici-
pating in efforts to solicit investment banking busi-
ness, including pitches and road shows. During the
offering period for an investment banking transac-
tion, research analysts may not participate in road
shows or other efforts to market the transaction.
• The firms will create and enforce firewalls
restricting interaction between investment bank-
ing and research except in specifically desig-
nated circumstances.
• To ensure that individual investors have access to
objective investment advice, the firms will be
obligated to furnish independent research. For a
five-year period, each of the firms will be required
to contract with no fewer than three independent
research firms that will make available indepen-
dent research to the firms’ customers. An inde-
pendent consultant for each firm will have final
authority to procure independent research.
at prices above what they would have otherwise
paid. This arrangement was an explicit quid pro quo
required by the bank in exchange for investors
receiving a continued stream of underpriced IPOs.
The conflict pitted the trading desk against the cor-
porate finance function, with the institutional
investor being the willing party to buy cold IPOs, or
overbuy hot IPOs, to assure the chances of a good
allocation for future hot IPOs. Clearly, not all inter-
actions between corporate finance and trading need
be conflict-ridden. In the early 1990s one large bank
ran a full-page ad with a large grizzly bear on it with
the caption “Your offering is only two hours old and
the bears smell lunch,” suggesting that lunch could
have been forestalled had the issuer chosen the
right investment bank with an appropriately coordi-
nated trading operation.
As a final example of this externally abetted con-
flict, consider the relatively new situation of what is
known as “sponsored research.” The practice has
arisen in the aftermath of Regulation Fair Disclosure
(Reg FD) and the general cutback on research cover-
age in the wake of the analyst controversies. Reg FD
essentially prohibited corporate officers from making
material nonpublic information available only to
select groups of individuals (for example, analysts and
investors) and instead required firms to broadly and
publicly disseminate information if they chose to
make it public to anyone. Certain issuing firms, espe-
cially smaller ones, have seen their research coverage
reduced or eliminated as brokers reduced analyst
coverage. Because issuers feel analyst coverage is
important to them, they are willing to pay to have
analysts cover their firm.6 Though this is usually the
domain of small brokers, it clearly places the analyst
in a conflicted position between the party that is pay-
ing him (the issuer) and the party that is likely to
make use of the research (the investor). In March of
this year, the Association for Investment Management
and Research (AIMR) released a draft calling for pub-
lic comment on the question of paid research reports,
among other analyst issues. 
Though there is evidence that analyst buy/sell
recommendations are biased, the market
appears to understand and correct for this bias.6. This exemption applies only to nationally recognized self-regulatory organizations, or NRSROs, a select cohort of SEC-
designated rating agencies.
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• To enable investors to evaluate and compare the
performance of analysts, research analysts’ his-
torical ratings will be disclosed. Each firm will
make its analysts’ historical ratings and price tar-
get forecasts publicly available. 
• The ten firms have collectively entered into a
voluntary agreement restricting allocations of
securities in hot IPOs—offerings that begin trad-
ing in the aftermarket at a premium—to certain
company executive officers and directors, a
practice known as “spinning.” This restriction will
promote fairness in the allocation of IPO shares
and prevent firms from using these shares to
attract investment banking business.
These reforms break into two groups. The first
set contains the requirements for the physical,
economic, managerial, and informational separa-
tion of research from investment banking. The
second set contains requirements for additional
information to be produced by the bank for the
benefit of investors, both for analysts’ historical
ratings and for the research of at least three inde-
pendent research firms. (The monetary penalties
assessed on the ten firms included a provision for
the firms to pay $432.5 million to fund this inde-
pendent research.) 
The settlement discusses in some detail the
actions of the various banks and how they violated
federal securities laws and SRO rules. The releases
do not establish a clear connection between the
actions of the banks and losses suffered by
investors. It is of course clear that beginning in
March 2000 the equity market in general, and tech-
nology stocks in particular, began a protracted slide
that shaved over 60 percent off the level of the
Nasdaq market. This group of ten banks under-
wrote a large portion of those firms. However, in his
findings in the litigation against Merrill Lynch, one
of the banks that settled conflict-of-interest charges
with regulators, Judge Milton Pollack determined
that the losses investors suffered in a subset of
the Merrill underwritings were not caused by the
actions of Merrill or its analysts (Pollack 2003).
Though Pollack’s opinion was technically a motion
to dismiss a class-action litigation, the salient point
of his opinion is that despite the incentive to do so,
the plaintiff’s lawyers were not able to craft an argu-
ment to show the investor’s losses could not be
attributable to the allegedly conflicted research
reports issued by Merrill.
Recently there has been an interesting develop-
ment in France in which the pendulum has swung
the other way on an analyst research report. A
French court ordered that Morgan Stanley pay
$38 million to LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton
because a research report issued by a respected
Morgan Stanley analyst was alleged to be overly
critical and full of errors, thereby defaming LVMH
(Norris and Sorkin 2004). Morgan Stanley repre-
sented Gucci, which was the subject of a failed
takeover by LVMH. The court case alleges that the
analyst warned of a potentially imminent down-
grading of LVMH’s debt and in doing so did not
respect the Chinese wall between research and
banking. The motive of the analyst will likely never
be known, but the case highlights the point that
whatever the opinions of analysts, positive or nega-
tive, aggrieved parties can allege malfeasance on
the part of analysts, stemming the flow of informa-
tion about issuers.
From a policy perspective we find ourselves in a
challenging position. First, the academic evidence
indicates that market prices anticipate and incorpo-
rate analysts’ biases. Second, private litigation and
government pronouncements have not turned up a
strong linkage between analyst actions and harm to
investors. An obvious question then emerges. On
what basis do regulators believe the first group of
remedies cited above that physically and economi-
cally separate banking from research will improve
investor welfare or investor protection? I believe
the evidence that it will is quite limited.
First, note that since the global settlement was
reached, the ten firms bound by the settlement have
had an average ratio of 3.86 times as many “buy” as
“sell” recommendations. For a group of seven other
smaller firms that were not part of the global settle-
ment, this ratio is 8.07. Post-settlement, “buy” rat-
ings are almost four times as likely as “sell” ratings
With falling wages and fewer information-
generating interactions, sell-side research 
is less likely to draw good individuals, and
the quality of research is likely to suffer,
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implicit in their recommendations. Yet they were
willing holders of almost all the stocks that led to the
broad retail investor losses. Rating agencies, whose
analysts are wholly independent from any conflict
arising from underwriting activity, also did not call
the aggregate misevaluation in the market in early
2000. As such, it is hard to attribute analyst behavior
as being a causal factor in investor harm. 
The marginal wealth loss retail investors suffered
arose from their undiversified holdings of stocks,
not a distortion or manipulation of stock prices. To me
it therefore makes more sense to look to the bro-
kers who put the retail investors in the stocks than
to the analysts themselves. These brokers should
have insured that retail investors had prudent and
diversified portfolios. The analysts’ euphoria may
not have altered share prices, but the analysts cer-
tainly did create hype in the market and enthusiasm
on the part of unsophisticated investors for tech-
nology stocks. It was brokers’ job to temper this
enthusiasm with prudent restraint. 
I am equally unconvinced that the second group
of reforms, those based on information, will have a
material impact on investor protection. The settle-
ment calls for the production of two new types of
information by banks: historical reports on analyst
track records and accuracy and the delivery of inde-
pendent research by those investors who desire it.
Analyst track records have been available to the
public from firms such as Zacks and I/B/E/S for
years. The private sector tracks analyst perfor-
mance and services, and newsletters are available
that permit investors to query the accuracy of an
analyst’s past calls. In addition, various periodicals
in the financial press publish annual evaluations of
model portfolios built from the investment banks’
stock selections over the course of the year. It
would therefore be surprising if information about
historical analyst track records had a significant
effect on investors.
More interesting and in many ways more com-
pelling is the requirement for independent research
to be made available to the banks’ retail clients.
Given the conflicts of interest that potentially taint
sell-side research and the empirical evidence that
affiliated analysts issue more “buy” ratings than
unaffiliated analysts, the solution seems a reason-
able one. However, as one considers the question
more carefully, certain issues come to mind.
First, it is worth asking why we do not already
have a well-developed community of independent
research analysts and why such a community has not
grown up to dominate in the battle for investor atten-
tion. There are many reasons for this, but perhaps
for large banks, and there remains a substantial
overpopulation of “buy” recommendations. Further,
the smaller firms such as A.G. Edwards, Keefe,
Bruyette & Woods, and Sandler O’Neill, which are
likely less conflicted by underwriting assignments
and were excluded from the terms of the settlement,
had a buy-to-sell ratio that was nearly double that of
large banks. Thus, banks that are unconflicted by
corporate finance business have a large enough frac-
tion of “buy” recommendations that one wonders
whether the underwriting conflicts really were the
root cause of the recommendation biases.
Second, if the analysts are physically and eco-
nomically separated from the rest of the bank, this
separation will drastically limit the scope economies
the research function has heretofore enjoyed. Along
with Reg FD, analysts will not be able to exploit any of
the information the bank generates in the course of its
other functions. The quality of the research product
will likely fall as analysts are isolated from other
parts of the firm. This decline in turn will drive down
the marginal product, and thus the wage, of the
analysts. In addition, the terms of the settlement
require that analyst compensation must be pri-
marily based on the quality and accuracy of their
research. With falling wages and fewer information-
generating interactions, sell-side research is less
likely to draw good individuals, and the quality of
research is likely to suffer, harming investors.
But even if the above two points are not true, the
core issue at hand is that there is no evidence that
analyst pronouncements harmed investors via share
price reactions to analyst forecasts and recommen-
dations. The evidence cited in the previous section
shows that underwriter analyst earnings forecasts
are more precise than the forecasts of unaffiliated
analysts, and though recommendations are biased
upward, the market sensibly discounts the “buy” rec-
ommendations of underwriter analysts. Securities
appear to be fairly priced and incorporate the poten-
tial biases of analysts. Institutional investors certainly
understood the pressures analysts faced and the bias
It is worth asking why we do not already have
a well-developed community of independent
research analysts and why such a community
has not grown up to dominate in the battle for
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chief among these is that it is very difficult to create
a viable business model for the sale of pure informa-
tion. Simply put, who is going to pay for the research
product that is produced by a stand-alone indepen-
dent research firm, and how will they pay for it? This
problem was addressed in 1971 in a seminal article
by Jack Hirshleifer on the value of information, albeit
in a different setting. Among other things, Hirshleifer
points out that it is difficult to derive a social benefit
from the public dissemination of private information. 
Consider an analyst with a substantial piece of pri-
vate information. If the analyst publishes the infor-
mation, prices may adjust, but no trading occurs
because everyone has the same piece of informa-
tion at the same time. Because no action is taken,
investor welfare is not changed. Now consider what
happens if the analyst tries to sell the information. If
the potential buyers cannot verify whether the infor-
mation is accurate or not, they will discount the price
they pay for the information from what the analyst
knows it to be worth. If the information is accurate,
the analyst would do better trading on it himself
as principal. If it is inaccurate, he sells it and the
buyer regrets the purchase. Also, note that the infor-
mation can never be sold a second time because the
first buyer will trade on the information as long as it
is profitable to do so and until prices move to reflect
the information. Thus, there is no resale market for
private information, and stand-alone business such
as rating agencies and stock research cannot exist.
Though Hirshleifer’s paper presents its results in a
stylized setting, it illustrates the salient point as
applied to this paper that selling research is a tough
business. It is no wonder that there is no business
model for independent research. Hirshleifer also
points out that the best use for accurate and credible
private research is to trade on it as principal. In the
securities market, people who make a business out of
doing this are known as hedge funds.
There are, however, some models of third-party
research in the financial services community. One
of these is the rating agencies, such as Standard &
Poor’s (S&P) and Moody’s. The ratings agencies are
independent organizations whose job is to provide
objective and dispassionate opinions about the
quality of debt and, to a lesser extent, equity secu-
rities. However, like the sell-side analysts, the rat-
ings agencies were criticized for failing to call the
market overvaluations in the late 1990s. Because
these agencies are putatively independent, their
shortcomings cannot be attributed to conflicts of
interest. The agencies’ performance casts doubt on
whether similar systematic errors on the part of
sell-side analysts were also conflict-driven. 
The ratings agencies operate with an advantage
unavailable to sell-side analysts, at least since
October 2000, in that issuers are exempt from
Reg FD when speaking with rating agencies. As
such, Moody’s and S&P can learn more from man-
agers about the condition and future prospects of
an issuer than can the analysts at sell-side firms.
Even with this private information, which will not
be available to the independent research firms cre-
ated by the settlement, the rating agencies are not
known to be at the cutting edge of research. 
Finally, rating agencies essentially give away their
primary research output in fixed income markets for
free. Bond ratings are public information, and the
rating agencies do not receive payment from
investors for the analysis. Instead, rating agencies
are paid by the issuers themselves, whose securities
the agencies rate, a structure that appears not to
trouble regulators for its clear conflicts of interest.
Rating agencies may prefer to receive payment from
investors in lieu of, or in addition to, payment from
issuers, but no credible model exists for doing so.
There are other types of third-party information
providers as well, such as Changewave Research,
Argus Research, Gimmie Credit, Sanford Bernstein,
and others, but again the question of how these
firms can be paid remains. In the case of Sanford
Bernstein, the firm has its own brokerage operation.
Because it is difficult to be paid directly for
research since this fee would come out of hard dol-
lars and be a direct management expense for the
clients, users of Bernstein research can pay for the
product by sending orders for stocks to Bernstein’s
brokerage desk. This activity is permissible under
the securities laws but represents another clear
conflict of interest. 
Furthermore, as with a firm such as Changewave
Research, if the research firm is too small to run a
trading desk, it can be paid via soft dollars, another
conflict of interest that basically allows for side
payment to be made to research firms from the
brokers that executed orders for the buy-side
Rating agencies are paid by the issuers them-
selves, whose securities the agencies rate, a
structure that appears not to trouble regula-
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the benefits of independence, the empirical data




hree overarching themes can be drawn from
the institutional and academic evidence of ana-
lyst research as it relates to conflicts of interest.
First, there is evidence that analysts issue biased
research in the sense that bias is defined by the fre-
quency of “buy” recommendations. Second, it is
clear that both issuers and investors believe credi-
ble analyst research is important, each for their own
purposes. Third, stock price reactions to analyst pro-
nouncements indicate that the market is not fooled
by the disingenuous recommendations of analysts
and that it appropriately incorporates biases that
may exist because of conflicts of interest.
Unfortunately, much of the policy stand taken by
regulators appreciates the first two points but fails
to acknowledge the third point. Money has been
lost in the stock market since early 2000, and ana-
lysts would appear logical parties to share some of
the blame. There does not appear to be a sound,
economically grounded basis for doing so, however.
Institutional as well as retail investors were taken in
by the market rise of the 1990s. As part of the pro-
fessional financial community, however, the institu-
tional investors of course knew of analysts’ conflicts
of interest. Such investors presumably adjusted
their buy and sell decisions to account for this bias.
Because large institutions are sophisticated partici-
pants and are likely the marginal investors in the
market, setting a stock’s marginal price, share
prices should reflect and appropriately discount
analyst biases. The real effect of the overly positive
research reports, however, may have been to cause
naive investors to hold more shares of risky securi-
ties than they would have otherwise held. In this
sense, the analysts may have contributed to certain
allocations of securities in the economy but likely
not to their misvaluation. Retail brokers might
therefore share more of the blame than they have
borne to date.
No one would argue that objective information is
better than conflicted information. But if, in the
case of stock research, this objectivity comes at the
cost of lost scale economies and more accurate
information dissemination, then it is incumbent on
the policymakers to show a concrete basis for the
remedies they propose and the investor protection
benefits they hope will result. In the case of the reg-
ulatory policy toward investment research, this
case has yet to be clearly made.
portfolio manager. These payments have only lim-
ited disclosure, masking much of the cost of the
research, and because the research is not paid in
hard dollars but through brokerage commissions,
the costs are borne by the beneficial owners of
the buy-side portfolio and not the investment
adviser. Not surprisingly, a number of independent
research firms have come out strongly opposed to
a recent proposal to ban or limit the use of soft
dollars for paying for research (see, for example,
ICAA 2004).
In advocating more independent research with-
out a valid and scalable business model for these
independent research firms, the SEC is in many
ways trading one set of conflicts of interest for
another. The conflicts reflected by arrangements
such as soft dollars simply represent a response by
banks’ clients to both their own environment and to
the internal conflicts of the banks themselves. Sell-
side research cannot be paid for on a stand-alone
basis, which the buy side knows, and thus institu-
tional advisers pay for research with brokerage. Not
only does sell-side research serve the purposes of
banks’ business model, but it forestalls the creation
of what otherwise might be a substantial cost cen-
ter in the banks.
Finally, with regard to independent research, the
paper by Clarke et al. (2004) looks at the timing of
analyst forecasts of earnings. If independent ana-
lysts were to really improve upon sell-side research
one would hope not only that their forecasts would
be more accurate than those of sell-side firms, which
they are not, but that the independent analysts would
also be leaders in the community of analysts in voic-
ing their views. The data show that this is not the
case. Independent analysts on average report their
earnings forecasts after the forecasts of analysts at
large investment banks. With regard to buy-sell rec-
ommendations, Clarke et al. find that the indepen-
dent analysts are much more likely to revise their
recommendation after both analysts at large banks
and analysts at nonunderwriting brokers. Whatever
Stock price reactions to analyst pronounce-
ments indicate that the market is not fooled
by the recommendations of analysts and that
it appropriately incorporates biases that stem
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